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RESPONSIILITY

FOR

SuiciDE.-[Indiana] Madge Oberholtzer was a resident of Indianapolis, Indiana. Appellant Stephenson, the Grand Kleagle of the Ku
Klux Klan of the state, also had a
home in the city. Miss Oberholzer
and Stephenson were slightly acquainted. The evening of March
15, 1925, she visited him in his
home. There appellant and the two
men who were co-defendants with
him in the original proceeding,
forced liquor upon her, and intimidated her with show of weapons.
The same night they took her to
Hammond, Indiana, in a Pullman,
Stephenson criminally assaulting
her during the trip. On arriving in
Hammond, about 6:30 a. m., the

four went to a hotel. After breakfast Miss Oberholtzer asked Stephenson for money, left the hotel in
the company of one of the co-defendants, and bought a hat and
some bichloride of mercury. On
her return to the hotel she took the
poison. Defendants, imnmediately
learning of her act, put her in the
back of a car and drove to Indianapolis. There Miss Oberholtzer was
placed in Stephenson's garage until
noon of March 17, when she was
taken home. She died April 14,
1925, twenty-nine days after the assault. Stephenson was held guilty
of murder in the second degree.
His two co-defendants were ac-

quitted. The decision was affirmed.
Stephenson v. State (Ind. 1932)
179 N. E. 633. The case had been
before the Supreme Court of Indiana once previously, on a hearing for writ of habeas corpus for
Stephenson v. Daly
Stephenson.
(1927) 200 Ind. 196, 158 N. E. 289.
Defendants were indicted on four
counts: first, that Miss Oberholtzer
died from wounds sustained in the
attack by Stephenson, and from
poison subsequently taken while she
was distracted with pain and shame;
second, that she died from the effects of poison taken under fear
and duress; third, that she died as
a result of wounds sustained in the
attack; fourth, that she died as a
result of defendant's failure to secure proper medical aid while deceased was under his control, suffering from the effects of poison.
Stephenson was found guilty on the
first count only. Reliable medical
testimony eliminated the possibility
of serious injury having arisen from
the wounds suffered in the assault.
The question remaining stands
alone: Shall the defendant be held
responsible for suicide committed
while deceased was distracted by
pain and shame?
The general doctrine covering
suicide is that if the act were committed while deceased was rendered
mentally irresponsible by wounds
administered by defendant, then the
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defendant is guilty of murder.
2 Bishop, "Criminal Law" (9th ed.
1923) sec. 639. The rule that one
who by his acts has rendered another
mentally irresponsible is liable for
the subsequent acts of the deranged
victim, including the taking of his
own life, heretofore has been limited
strictly to cases in which physical
wounds inflicted by the defendant
were the cause of the derangement:
People v. Lewis (1899) 124 Cal.
551, 57 Pac. 470, 45 L. R. A. 783.
This court extends the foregoing
doctrine, previously limited in its
application, to any injury, either
physical or mental, which may be
found to be the reasonable and probable cause of the irresponsibility.
The court depends upon three
general classes of cases to support
its extension of the rule. The first
of these is represented by Wilder v.
Rissell Library Co. (1927) 107
Conn. 56, 139 Atl. 644, 56 A. L. R.
This is a much-criticized
455.
workmen's compensation case in
which an employer was held civilly
liable for the suicide of an employee deranged by overwork. P
seems obvious that this case furnishes no authority for the application of the suicide doctrine to a
criminal case, such as Stephenson
v. State, supra. The second class
of cases is that in which suicide
was committed while the deceased
was in fear of physical violence at
the hands of the defendant. The
early common law denied any criminal responsibility unless death was
the direct result of physical violence: East "Pleas of the Crown"
(1803) chap. 5, sec. 13; 1 Hale
"Pleas of the Crown" (1778) 429.
In later stages of development the
doctrine has been extended to cases
in which deceased committed suicide while under a well grounded
fear of violence: Rex v. Valade
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(1915) 26 Can. Cr. C. 233; Rex v.
Beech (1912) 23 Cox Cr. Cases 181.
In this type of case the courts have
been loath to allow any deviation
from a strict interpretation of "immediate fear of violence": Lewis
v. Commonwealth (1898) 19 Ky.
Law Rep. 1139, 42 S. W. 1127. The
third class of cases advanced by the
court to support its holding is that
in which deceased inflicted a mortal
wound on himself while suffering
from a wound inflicted by defendant, the latter not necessarily being
mortal: State v. Angelina (1913)
73 W. Va. 146, 80 S. E. 141, 51 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 877 and note. These
cases depend almost entirely upon
the derangement of the victim as
the result of the first wound. In the
instant case Miss Oberholtzer's acts
subsequent to the attack reveal that
her mental condition was sound, a
condition found in none of the supporting cases quoted by the court.
Two findings are necessary to
support the unusual rule adopted by
the court: first that Miss Oberholtzer
was mentally irresponsible when
she took her life; second, that the
acts of the defendant were the proximate cause of the irresponsibility.
The trial of this case was not held
upon the question of irresponsibility at all; no evidence was introduced on that point. The court
calmly assumed that the suicide in
itself was sufficient indication of
the irresponsibility of the deceased.
Thus it appears that the court fails
to comply with the rule which it
lays down. In summary, the court
decided that Madge Oberholtzer
had destroyed herself while distracted by pain and shame resulting
from the acts of Stephenson, and
that Stephenson must atone for the
results of his deed. The distraction
found by the court was not proved,
but assumed; the pain alleged
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to have caused the distraction
was insufficient to prevent Miss
Oberholtzer from going out shopping, and eluding an escort-guard
to buy poison. The shame which
the court found to have contributed
to the distraction never before has
been regarded as sufficient to hold
the one responsible for its existence
criminally liable for acts committed
while under its influence.
It seems that the explanation of
this case lies outside the lawbooks.
Stephenson was, at the time of the
assault, the head of the Ku Klux
Klan of Indiana, a secret organization which for some time had exerted a somewhat sinister influence
in Indiana politics. In Miss Oberholtzer's dying declaration it was set
forth that Stephenson had attempted
to cow her into silence by boasts
of his invulnerable political position. He had said many times, "I
am the law and the power." To
have ordered a new trial in this
case would have seemed to the general public to be a proof of the
truth of the boast. Stephenson's
guilt of a heinous offense was clear.
Justice could have gained nothing
by a new trial; public faith in the
courts would have been shaken by
a reversal in such a notorious case.
Unfortunately, affirmance required
that violence be done to established
legal theory. The exigency of the
situation overbalanced judicial repugnance to the violation of longestablished principles, and the case
appears in the vulnerable form
above set forth.
ROBERT L. GROvER.
MURDER- WITHDRAWAL OF VERDICT- FORM - LESS THAN UNANIm oUS VERDICTs.-[Illinois] On June
9, 1930, Alfred J. Lingle, a reporter
for the Chicago Tribune, was shot

and killed in a tunnel used by
pedestrians in crossing under Michigan Avenue to the Randolph Street
station of the Illinois Central Railroad in Chicago. The homicide was
committed at 1:30 p. m. amid a
crowd of people hurrying through
the tunnel to trains. The murderer
dashed through the east end of the
tunnel, crossed Michigan Avenue
through -heavy traffic to the north
side of Randolph street, and then
escaped after a short chase. Lingle
was a special "gangland" reporter
and had a thorough knowledge of
the underworld. The newspapers,
especially the one which had employed him, gave considerable space
to the crime, and as a consequence
of this, as well as the audacity of
the crime, the public interest was
aroused. The apprehension of the
criminal seemed an impossible task
because of the lack of clues, but
the gun which had been used was
found, and though the serial number had been obliterated, it was restored with an etching fluid by the
Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory of Northwestern University,
and both dealer and purchaser were
identified. An active man-hunt was
carried on for some time by a special investigator appointed by the
State's Attorney, and finally Leo V.
Brothers, the defendant, was captured and charged with the crime.
The trial was lengthy and attracted
unusual attention. One of the jurors
consistently voted not guilty, refusing to assign any reason for his
vote or even to discuss it, and it
was only after the other eleven
jurors agreed to inflict the minimum
punishment for murder, fourteen
years, that he consented to vote
guilty. On appeal the defendant
contended that a reversible error
had been committed by the trial
court in withdrawing in the absence
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of the defendant a verdict-form of
manslaughter submitted by mistake
to the jury. Other questions were
raised, but need no comment. Held,
on appeal: the case should be affirmed: People v. Brothers (1932)
347 Ill. 530, 180 N. E. 442.
The majority of the court held
that only such a communication
made in the absence of the accused
as was prejudicial to him was a
reversible error. The defendant's
presence is not essential throughout
the entire trial, though it may be
imperative at the arraignment, the
swearing of the jury, the presentation. of the evidence, and the reading of the verdict. Furthermore,
this was solely a case of identification, and under no theory could
Brothers have been found guilty of
manslaughter; he was either guilty
of murder, or else he was innocent
of any crime. The rule of the majority is far more flexible than that
of the dissent, which was that any
communication under these circumstances was a ground for reversal.
The dissent seems to recognize that
in this particular case the communication was not of itself reversible error, for it says: "If this
single case were the only one to be
affected by this judgment, it might
not be a matter of serious importance, but it is of serious importance if this case becomes a
precedent." (p. 453.)
Apparently
the dissent is too deeply impressed
by the sanctity of precedent, wishing to decide each point as it arises,
not only for the particular set of
facts in the case, but for all cases
to arise in the future. The dissent
would require that any communication made in the absence of the defendant, no matter how harmless,
result in the reversal of the case
and a new trial. The Brothers
case, however, was a long and ex-
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pensive one and the communication
did no harm. A reversal would
mean that the expense of the trial
would be duplicated, with the result, in all probability, the same.
There is a larger question in the
case, however, and that has to do
with a modification of the present
requirement of a unanimous verdict.
As previously stated, one juror, by
holding out, forced a compromise.
Disagreements are even more costly
and unsatisfactory in criminal than
in civil cases; the advantages
throughout the trial are with the
defendant (burden of proof on the
state, sole right of the defendant to
appeal, to mention only several),
but disagreements give him an even
greater advantage, for "time is the
most dependable of defenses":
Green, "Judge and Jury" (1930)
404. There is nothing in the history of the jury system to support
a requirement of a unanimous verdict of twelve. Originally, disputes
were referred to the neighbors of
the litigants in the county, who decided the case according to their
own knowledge of the facts. It was
necessary to a verdict that twelve
agree, and new members were added
to the panel by the sheriff until
twelve were found who could agree.
This was not a rule requiring unanimity, but solely a rule of evidence
requiring a certain degree of proof.
Furthermore, although the Constitution of the United States guarantees a jury trial, it does not define it, saying nothing as to the
number composing a jury nor as to
a requirement of unanimity. "The
requirement is based upon the
court's interpretation or misinterpretation of custom": Wilkin "The
Jury: Reformation, Not Abolition"
(1930) 13 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 154, 156.
In several states work has already
been done along this line by allow-
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ing verdicts in civil cases by nine
of the twelve jurors.
That there is great possibility of
disagreement when the unanimous
verdict is required may be shown
quite easily. There are thirteen
possible ways for twelve men to
vote, ranging from a unanimous
vote for the defendant to-a unanimous vote for the state. Only two
of these votes can result in verdicts; consequently eleven of the
thirteen possible votes result in disagreements. The questions which a
jury is called upon to decide always
have an element of doubt in them
or else they would never become
questions for a jury; if they were
perfectly clear and unmistakable, it
would be unreasonable as well as
exceedingly expensive to submit
them to a jury to obtain an obvious
answer. Using the three-fourths
rule, the possibility of a disagreement is reduced to five of thirteen,
and with the rule of ten, it is seven
of thirteen. The statistics with regard to the number of disagreements cannot be determined with
any degree of accuracy because
"most disagreements, as far as theyaffect the plaintiff [the state in a
criminal case] and the defendant,
are the disagreements which result
in ridiculous compromises .
.":
Sawyer "Jury Disagreements and
the Three-Fourths Rule" (1912) 10
Ohio Law Rev. 284. Of course, the
value of compromises as inflicting
punishment where no punishment
would otherwise be given, must be
admitted.
Modification of the jury system
may be justified on the grounds of
reasonable doubt, if, indeed, any
rationalizing be necessary. A jury
might be treated as a unit for this
purpose, and a court might arbitrarily (which is nothing more than
good government from a practical
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standpoint) state that an eleven to
one vote did not imply a reasonable
doubt of guilt on the part of the
jury as a whole, while an eight to
four vote did. Thus there would be
a "double doubt," one to the determined by each individual juror
himself, and another, the doubt of
the jury as a whole, to be determined as a matter of course
from some pre-arranged scale.
To return and apply this explanation to the Brothers case, one
sees first that there were no mitigating or extenuating circumstances,
and secondly, that the case was one
of identification only. If Brothers
were the man who did the killing,
he should have been given the maximum punishment for murder, and if
he were not the man, he should
have been given his freedom. The
doubt that the one juror had, was
something less than the reasonable
doubt required before he should
have voted not guilty. That this is
true may be determined from the
fact that he did vote guilty when
the minimum punishment for murder was secured. Let us say that
the doubt that the one juror possessed was one-third of what would
be considered a reasonable doubt.
As a result, we would have in this
situation one-third of a doubt of
one-twelfth of the jury, since the
other eleven consistently voted
guilty from the start, or one-thirtysixth of the doubt of the jury as
a whole. This one-thirty-sixth was
sufficient to force a compromise.
Of course, there is no way of measuring a person's convictions or
doubts with any degree of precision,
but this illustration does show that
even one juror whose mind is not
clearly made up, has the power to
force eleven who are certain beyond a reasonable doubt to accept
a result unsatisfactory to them.
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Modification of the jury system
to allow less than a unanimous vote
to result in a verdict is an expedient open to those who wish to reform the administration of criminal law. To allow one juror who
may be perverse, prejudiced, ignorant, or corrupt to force a delay or
undesirable compromise is an evil
in the present system that should
be eradicated. Moreover, the fact
that one man has the power to
modify the decision of eleve! men
plays into the hand of the jury
"fixer." When one juror is bribed,
which is all that is necessary now,
there is no one to furnish corroboration in the event of a confession, but if more than one were
bribed, there would be corroborating testimony; this fact would tend
to minimize jury "fixing." No reflection upon the juror in the Brothers case should be taken from this
discussion, but the possibility of
corruption under the present system should be recognized.
The
weakness of the present system lies
in the localizing of too much power
in the individual juror, elevating
him to a position of power out of
proportion to his intrinsic importance. The proposal to allow
less than unanimous verdicts is suggested as a means of correcting the
evil of corrupt juries as well as
that of undesirable compromise verdicts, both of which are inherent
in the present system requiring
unanimous verdicts.
MARSHAL WIEDEL.

ARRE T-FORCE AN OFFICER MAY
USE To EFFECT ARREST.-[Federal]
The defendant, a federal prohibition officer, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. He and two
other officers were attempting to
arrest deceased and another whom

they found operating a still. The
testimony was conflicting, the defense claiming that the deceased
threatened one of the officers with
a pistol and that the defendant shot
him upon his refusal to drop the
weapon. Defendant testified that
he shot at deceased's legs and did
not intend to kill him. The prosecution introduced testimony that
the deceased ran when the officers
arrived, that they ordered him to
stop, and began shooting when he
continued running. The trial court
instructed the jury that they should
acquit the defendant if they found
that, when he shot deceased, the
deceased was pointing his pistol at
one of the officers, but should convict him if he fired while deceased
was running away and no longer
threatening the other officer. Held:
reversed and a new trial granted
because of this erroneous instruction. The rule applicable here was
not that of self-defense, but that as
to the force which an officer may
use to effect the arrest of a felon,
when such felony is committed in
the officer's presence.
The rule
enunciated by the appellate court
is that the officer was justified in
using such force as under the circumstances
appeared
reasonably
necessary to effect the arrest or prevent the escape of a felon, and if
the reasonable use of such force
resulted in the death of the felon.
the officer was not to be held criminally accountable therefor: Stinnet v. Commonwealth (C. C. A.
1932) 55 Fed. (2d) 644.
An officer of the law, like any
private person, always has the right
of self-defense. This, however, is
not sufficient, because his duty to
effect arrests requires him to act
affirmatively. An officer whose duty
it is to make an arrest has a right
to use such reasonable force as is
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necessary to overcome the resistance
offered, and to make the arrest even
to the extent of taking life: People v. Brooks (1901) 131 Cal. 311,
63 Pac. 464. He may never usd
unnecessary force or dangerous
means if the arrest can be effected otherwise. The amount of
force and the means are left to the
sound discretion of the officer, within reasonable limits, but upon trial
the reasonableness of the force is
a question for the jury: State v.
Bland (1887) 97 N. C. 438, 2 S. E.
460. The standard by which such
reasonableness is measured is that
of the ordinarily prudent man under the circumstances: Scibor v.
Oregon-Washington R. Co. (1914)
70 Or. 116, 140 Pac. 629.

Wash. 508, 182 Pac. 599; People v.
Kilvington (1894) 104 Cal. 86, 37
Pac. 799. The more general rule
is that mere suspicion of the commission of a felony will not justify
killing to prevent the escape of a
suspected person; and that in so
doing the officer acts at his peril,
thereby subjecting himself to prosecution and liability if it develops
that in fact no felony has been committed: Wiley v. State (1918) 19
Ariz. 346, 170 Pac. 869, L. R. A.
1918D 373.
Upon trial an officer is never the
final arbiter of the necessity to kill,
this being a question for the jury
under all the evidence: State v.
Montgomery (1910) 230 'Mo. 660,
132 S. W. 232. While most deWhere no active resistance is of- cisions require as justification only
fered and the person whom the of- that the killing be necessary to the
ficer is trying to arrest merely flees, arrest, some require that it be an
the amount of force which the of-" absolute necessity: Conraddy v.
ficer may use is dependent upon People (1862) 5 Park. Cr. (N. Y.)
whether he is arresting for a felony 234, while others require only apparent necessity: Lindle v. Comor a misdemeanor.
The usual rule is that an officer monwealth (1901) 111 Ky. 866, 64
may take the life of one charged S. W. 986, or probable necessity:
with felony if necessary to effect Jackson v. State (1888) 66 Miss.
arrest or prevent escape: State v. 89, 5 So. 690, 14 Am. St. Rep. 542.
When arresting for a misdeSmith (1905) 127 Ia. 534, 103 N.
W. 944, 70 L. R. A. 246. Since meanor the usual rule is that an
this can be done only as a last re- officer may never kill merely to efsort, the officer must be certain that fect an arrest, even though the perthe person he is attempting to arrest son he is attempting to arrest
is aware that an officer is trying to escapes: Commonwealth v. Lougharrest him for a felony; unless this head (1907) 218 Pa. 429, 67 Atd.
is done the officer is not considered 747, 120 Am. St. Rep. 896. Of
as having exhausted all other course, the officer still has the right
means.
of self-defense and the duty to overThe decisions have not been uni- come all forcible resistance: Fugate
form where the officer is arresting v. Commonwealth (1920) 187 Ky.
upon mere suspicion of felony. 564, 219 S. W. 1069. There are a
Some hold that if the officer has few decisions purporting to hold,
reasonable grounds to believe a perhaps in dicta alone, that an offelony has been committed he may ficer may kill if necessary to effect
use the same means to arrest as if an arrest for a misdemeanor: State
in fact a felony had been com- v. Dierberger (1888) 96 Mo. 666,
mitted: Coldeen v. Reid (1919) 107 10 S. W. 168, 9 Am. St. Rep. 380;
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see 28 Mich. L. Rev. 957.
In Reneau v. State (1879) 2 Lea
(70 Tenn.) 720, the court, after
holding that an officer may as a
last resort kill a felon to effect an
arrest, said:

".

.

it may be a

question worthy of consideration
whether the law ought not to be
modified in respect to the lower
grade of felonies, especially in view
of the large number of crimes of
this character created by comparatively recent legislation, whether as
to these even escape would not be
better than to take life."
At common law all felonies were
punishable by death and so it was
not considered a great loss if the
arresting officer killed the felon, as
the felon's life was forfeit. The
word felony no longer means a
crime punishable by death, yet the
old common law is still in effect.
At the last meeting of the American Law Institute a proposed uniform act on this subject was discussed: Proceedings, Vol. IX, p. 179
et seq. The act made it necessary, to
excuse a killing or wounding by a
police officer, that the arrest be a
lawful one, that the officer reasonably believe that the arrest cannot
be otherwise effected, that he reasonably believe that the suspected
person knows of the officer's attempt
to arrest him, that the offense for
which the officer is trying to arrest
is either treason, murder, voluntary
manslaughter, mayhem, arson, robbery, common law rape, kidnapping,
burglary or assault with intent to
murder, rape or rob, and that the
person killed or wounded is the one
named in the warrant or if there
is no warrant the officer reasonably
believes the offense was committed
by the person killed or wounded.
It was argued, however, that the
rule should be more liberal so as to
put the burden upon the lawbreaker,

rather than upon the officer to decide points of law at his peril. It
was suggested that the common law
did not deal with the modern armed
bandit, that we should not weaken
the police officer who protects us
from the war being levied by organized crime, and that there are
few bloodthirsty officers who would
abuse their privileges under a more
liberal act. Those who supported
the act disclaimed any quarrel with
the officer who met force by force,
but pointed out that the proposed
act meant to deal only with cases
where there was no active resistance, but merely a fleeing on the
part of the person the officer was
trying to arrest. The Institute took
no final action, but voted to return
the proposed uniform act to a committee for further consideration
and report at the next meeting.
The law always has held human
life to be very valuable. It would
seem that society loses more through
the death of those who have committed minor felonies, which today
need not be very serious offenses,
than it gains through the arrest of
all such persons, who are only potentially dangerous. Should not the
law on this point be changed so as
to have greater regard for human
life ?
WESLEY F. HANNER.
CONFESSIONS WHETHER VOLUNTARY

EVIDENCE
OR NOT.-

[New York] Plaintiff in error was
convicted by a jury upon his own
repudiated confession which was
made under the following circumstances: Before he was arraigned
in court, he was illegally detained
for thirty-six hours, during which
period he was questioned by five
police officers.
Promising to tell
the truth if given food, the con-
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dition was performed, and he made
a detailed confession which he repeated in all its particulars to an
assistant district attorney several
hours later. Held: reversed and a
new trial ordered. This court is
left with doubts and fears that the
confessions were obtained by brutality and threats: People v. Mummiani (1932) 258 N. Y. 394, 180
N. E. 94 (O'Brien, Kellogg, and
Hubbs, JJ. dissenting).
The history of the doctrine of
confessions divides itself into four
stages:
(1) Confessions in the rSoo's
and x6oo's. In this stage exclusionary rules are conspicuous
by their absence. All confessions
were admitted into evidence without question as to their proceeding
from hope of promises or from
fear of threats. Technically a
confession was the equivalent of
a plea of guilty, and in the words
of Serjeant Hawkins, "the highest conviction that can be made":
Hawkins (1716) Pleas of the
Crown, b. II, c. 31; 2 Wignzore
"Evidence" (2d ed. 1923) sec.
817. See also: Staunford (1607)
Pleas of the Crown, b. 2, c. 51;
Hale (1680) Pleas of the Crown
(Emlyn's ed.) 225.
(2) Confessions in the Second Half of the xToo's. In this
period exclusionary rules were
first given articulation by Lord
Mansfield in Rudd's Case (1775)
1 Leach Cr. C. 135, where the
accused applied for release in consequence of having confessed under an assurance of pardon, to
be received as an accomplice testifying for the Crown. The following statement was made: "The
instance has frequently happened
of persons having made confessions under threats or promises;
the consequence as frequently has

been that such examinations and
confessions have not been made
use of against them on their
trial." This was followed by
1
Warickshall's Case (1783)
Leach Cr. C. 298, wherein the
modern rule was given clear
statement in the declaration that
confessions obtained by threats
and promises are inadmissible in
evidence.
(3) Confessions in the i8oo's.
In this stage an abnormal situation predominated. Exclusion became the rule, admission the exception. Thus a statement to the
accused by a .person in authority
that he "had better tell the truth"
prevented the confession made in
response thereto from being introduced in evidence: Hardin v.
State (1898) 66 Ark. 53, 48 S.
W. 904; Brain v. United States
(1897) 168 U. S. 532, 42 L. Ed.
568; Biscoe v. State (1889) 67
Md. 6; Rizzolo v. Commonwealth
(1889) 126 Pa. 54; Hudson v.
Commonwealth (1866) 2 Duv.
(Ky.) 531. Also, the statement
"what you say will be held for or
against you," made the subsequent confession bad for the reason that the accused might think
it an inducement to admit guilt:
Pryor v. State (1899) 40 Tex.
Cr. 643, 51 S.W. 375; Unsell v.
State (1898) 39 Tex. Cr. 330, 45
S. W. 1022; Gunn v. State (1898)
39 Tex. Cr. 257, 45 S. W. 694.
An admonition to the defendant
that he "had better confess" was
viewed with little favor by the
majority of courts: State v.
Davis (1899) 125 N. C. 612, 34
S. E. 198; Banks v. State (1887)
84 Ala. 430, 4 So. 382; Commonwealth v.Nott (1883) 135 Mass.
269; People v. Ward (1836) 15
Wend. (N. Y.) 231. And it was
held that a question directed at
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the accused involving the assumption of his guilt, excluded the resulting confession:
State v.
Clarissa; (1847) 11 Ala. 57. The
application of this principle resulted in much confusion but the
courts clung to it nevertheless.
It was thus laid down in the federal courts until recently: Hansen v. United States (1895) 156
U. S. 51; Hopt v. Utah (1884)
110 U. S. 574,4 Sup. Ct. 202. This
open and shut viewpoint has been
modified by the federal courts
since the case of Wan v. United
States (1924) 266 U. S. 1, 69 L.
Ed. 131.
(4) Confessions in the i9oo's.
These years represent a reaction
to the previous period, with attempts at arriving upon a middle
ground by a scrutiny of all the
circumstances in which the confession was made: 2 Wigmore,
supra, sec. 817. Thus a suggestion that the accused had better
go on and tell the truth had no
element of an unlawful inducement: State v. McGuire (Mo.
1931) 39 S. W. (2d) 523; State
v. Myers (1931) 202 N. C. 351,
162 S. E. 764. Also, where accused made a confession a few
days after inducements were offered it was held, that the inducements without more were insufficient to invalidate the confession, and that it must clearly
appear from all the circumstances that the inducements
operated at the time the confession was made in order that it be
inadmissible:
People v. Dye
(Cal. 1931) 6 P. (2d) 313. That
the defendant was intoxicated by
a drug while making his confession goes only to its weight as
evidence amnng other circumstances but does not render it
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inadmissible: People v. Sameniego (Cal. 1931) 5 P. (2d) 653.
The doctrine of confessions is a
mixed one, including both law and
fact. It is the duty of the judge
to determine whether or not the
confession proceeded from threats
or promises in passing upon its admissibility. It is the duty of the
jury, after the confesion is once admitted, to pass upon its credibility.
This sharp distinction in the function of the judge and of the jury is
recognized in the majority of American jurisdictions: People v. Fox
(1926) 319 Ill. 606, 150 N. E. 347;
People v. Guido (1926) 321 Ill. 397,
152 N. E. 149; Bates v. Smith
(1920) 78 Fla. 672, 84 So. 373;
Commonwealth v. Russ (1919) 232
Mass. 58, 122 N. E. 176; 2 Wigmore,
supra, sec. 861. However, there are
many courts which hold that, after
the judge has applied the legal tests
and admitted the confession, the
jury are to apply them again and
by that token reject the confession.
This is the minority rule: Gin Bock
Sing v. U. S. (1926) 8 Fed. (2d)
976; People v. Randazzio (1909)
194 N. Y. 147, 87 N. E. 112; Commonwealth v. Bond (1906) 170
2Mass. 41, 48 N. E. 756; 2 Wigmore,
supra, sec. 817. This view is criticized principally on the ground that
the question of admissibility is one
of law which is guided by the application of legal tests unfamiliar to
a jury: 2 Wigmore, supra, sec. 817.
It is not without some importance
to note that the state of New York
falls within the minority rule: People v. Lytton (1931) 257 N. Y. 310,
178 N. E. 290; People v. Barbato
(1930) 254 N. Y. 170, 172 N. E.
458; People v. Doran (1927) 246
N. Y. 409, 159 N. E. 379; People
v. Randazzio, supra; People v. Rogers (1908) 192 N. Y. 331, 85 N. E.
135; People v. Brash (1908) 193
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N. Y. 46, 85 N. E. 809. But in
a recent case New York has modified its adherence to this rule by
limiting the function of the jury to
cases where there is a conflict in the
evidence on the question of voluntariness: People v. Weiner (1928)
248 N. Y. 118, 161 N. E. 441. In
other words, where no conflict is
present, no question of fact.is present, and just as the judge is bound
to admit or reject the confession
without hesitation because of the
absence of adverse evidence, so it
is presumed the jury would accept
or reject the confession for the
same reason. Suffice it to say that
there was a conflict of evidence in
the principal case.
Ordinarily a trial court's ruling
on admissibility will not be disturbed on review unless the trial
court has clearly abused its discretion: State v. Green (1929) 128
Ore. 49, 273 Pac. 381; State v.
Brady (1927) 104 W. Va. 523, 140
S. E. 546; Davis v. State (1925)
178 Wis. 114, 189 N. W. 558, 24
A. L. R. 490; Greenwood v. State
.(1913) 107 Ark. 568, 158 S. W. 427.
It is submitted that New York presents a singular view on this point,
unless yielding to the jury a question which they had a right by law
to decide, can be considered a clear
abuse of discretion; it is further
submitted that the timidity displayed
by this decision is a "mental reversion" to the attitude of courts of
the nineteenth century toward confessions.
ALVIN R. KArz.
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tress after the latter had refused to
end a clandestine relationship which
had broken up a home." By the
terms of the injunction, the erring
husband and his paramour were
"enjoined to desist, and refrain
from seeing, communicating, talking, associating, and having sexual
relations with each other." Injunction issued in Dunham v. Dunham,
March, 1932, from Superior Court
of Cook County.
To the student of criminal law,
this unusual injunction brings to
mind a trend in the law which is
typically American, and in sharp
contrast with the situation in the
only other English speaking nation.
In England adultery is no longer a
punishable legal offense. In fact, it
has been suggested that "it would
hardly be possible to restore it as
an offense under [English] law":
Note (1930) 74 Sol. J. 717. In our
own country adultery is a penal offense in practically every state. In
England there is no criminal statute
punishing the voluntary, private
"sexual expression" of adults. In
the United States, about thirty-five
states make cohabitation between
unmarried persons criminal. And
in about twenty states it is a criminal offense for two unmarried
adults, acting voluntarily and in
private, to engage in a single act
of sexual connection. (Statistics
taken from May, "Legal Control of
Sex Expression" (1929) 39 Yale L.
J. 219.) The same writer also indicates how in this country there
is not only a continuing demand for
new substantive laws for the regulation of sexual conduct, but also
INJUNCTIONS IN FAMILY RELAmany newly proposed administraTIONS - GOVERNMENT AND MOR.,S.
tive measures for the enforcement
-[Illinois]
As part of a proceed- of moral laws. These facts are siging for separate maintenance, an in- nificant. The growing tendency to
junction issued "which stepped be- enlarge the jurisdiction of governtween a man and his alleged mis- ment over the most intimate human
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relations renders it imperative that
we study closely each new attempt
of government in this direction.
The injunction issued in the instant
case is perhaps such an attempt, in
perfect keeping with developments
in the criminal law, and calling for
careful consideration.
The first question prompted by
the decision is the propriety of the
injunction from the standpoint of
technique or theory. The obvious
difficulty lies, of course, in the
traditional maxim that equity acts
only on property rights. That the
ancient maxim still lives was illustrated as recently as one year ago
by a noted writer on equity jurisprudence,_whose work as revised
announces it to be still the rule
that "a party is not entitled to a
writ of injunction for a matter affecting his person . . . Where
the gist of the injury is purely
personal the fact that it may be
injurious to property does not give
the court jurisdiction": Bispham,
"Principles of Equity" (11th ed.
1931) sec. 436. This doctrine has
been subjected to considerable criticism both in the cases and by law
writers, expressed in an avowed
tendency to depart from such limitation on the jurisdiction of equity
courts: Note (1921) 14 A. L. R.
295, and 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1147;,
Chaffee, "Cases on Equitable Relief" (1930).
To some writers it
has appeared that the traditional
rule, taken literally, makes the system of equity suitable only to a
"semi-savage society which has
much respect for property but little for human life": Note (1897)
37 L. R. A. 783; note (1920) 5
Cornell Law Quar. 177. A few
courts, in extending their equitable
protection over what they believed
to be valuable personal rights, have
refused to recognize the validity of
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the venerable maxim:
Stark v.
Hamilton (1919) 149 Ga. 227, 99
S. E. 40 (where the court, upon the
petition of a father, restrained the
defendant from further debauching complainant's infant daughter).
This hostile attitude towards limiting equity jurisdiction is growing
in all fields of law, but Texas has
been especially prominent in asserting an enlarged jurisdiction of
equity over a suit whose object is
to preserve the marital relation and
to conserve and rehabilitate the
wavering affections of the accused
spouse: Ex Parte Warfield (1899)
40 Tex. Cr. Rep. 413, 50 S. W. 933;
Witte v. Bauderer (Tex. Civ. App.
1923) 255 S. W. 1016; Smith v.
Womack (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 271
S. W. 209. Other courts, however,
apparently more respectful to tradition, have worked out theories by
which presumably desirable ends are
reached within the technical range
of the property right limitation. In
the class of cases under discussion,
where a stranger threatens to destroy the family relation, there is
no great distortion of legal theory
in finding a property interest in the
right of consortium, or in the right
of the husband, if he is the aggrieved party, to the services of his
wife. To some, this method of finding a property right involved so as
to evade the rule of equity has
seemed an unbecoming subterfuge;
as Mr. Pound expresses it, "something is found which gives the
camel's nose legitimate standing in
the Chancellor's tent, and the whole
beast follows in order to dispose of
the case completely. Such devices
never obtain except when we are
dealing with a moribund rule":
Pound "Equitable Relief Against
Injuries" (1916) 29 Harv. Law
Rev. 640.
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Another mode of approach from
the point of view of technique is
the consideration of the interest involved as one consisting essentially
in one's relation with third persons.
Perhaps we are dealing here with
an interest which is more closely
analagous to one's professional and
trade relations than to the interest
of one's personality as that term is
commonly understood in the law:
Green "Judge. and Jury" (1931) p.
5. The same writer points out that
the use of the injunction is one of
the favorite modes employed by
courts in protecting this interest
which one has in his relations with
other persons: Ibid. p. 15. There
is some judicial recognition of this
attitude towards disturbance of the
domestic tranquility as an injury
to one's relation with others, a relation here rising out of the marriage contract, and constituting an
interest as valuable as that arising
out of an employment contract:
dissent in Snedaker v. King (1924)
111 Ohio St. 225, 145 N. E. 15
(where the court reversed the decision of the trial court granting
an injunction very similar to the
one granted in the instant case).
The working out of an escape
mechanism, to evade the result of
the property requirement in this
type of case, is less important than
the consideration of whether it is
desirable in this way further to extend the interference of government in the more intimate phases
of life. At best it involves the
judiciary in an extremely unpleasant task of administering to maladjustments far too delicate for the
average court to tamper with at all.
From a realistic standpoint, whatever may be the legal relation of
the parties, there is a palpable difference between enjoining A. from
interfering with B.'s employment
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contract with C., and an order to a
wayward spouse to love his or her
mate, who, as attested to in the bill,
has been ever loving, and faithful
beyond reproach. The picture is
significant from whatever angle
the problem of social expediency is
considered, whether it be moral,
administrative, or preventive. From
the aspect of morality there is much
to be said against "vesting in the
discretion of a judge the power to
prevent the intercourse of responsible persons who have committed no crime": Note (1899) 3
Law Notes 166. The same writer
significantly indicates
that the
whole proceeding neglects "the fact
that a wife is a distinct personality,
having other rights and duties in
life besides the duty of yielding
service and affection to the husband." Clearly there are subtler
phases of human relations which,
for moral purposes, are better left
to the dictates of conscience than
to the supervision of civil jurisdiction. From the aspect of administration, the difficulties are also
manifest. One court has pointed
out that proof of the violation of
the court's order, enforceable only
through contempt proceedings, must
necessarily come through the testimony of two or three persons
standing in such a relation to each
other as to make most arduous the
task of the arbiiter: Snedaker v.
King, supra. Frankness also dictates the suggestion that more often
than not the entire proceeding will
have been commenced under the
urge of jealousy and rage that another is proving more successful as
a lover. And from the aspect of
the use of the injunction in such
cases as a preventive measure, one
writer has pertinently indicated how
"the failure of the law to secure
obedience has been historically
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shown in at least four fields of human life . . . (1) In the field
of personal morals. This has always been a favorite interest of the
law, but its failures in this field
are proverbial": Cohen "Limits of
Idealism in the Law" (1927) 27
Col. Law Rev. 3.
Perhaps there is something even
in the suggestion that 'an order
that forbids a man and woman to
see each other merely adds fuel to
the flame. If the wife is to be assisted in her fight for a rehabilitated
home, action should not be taken
which will almost inevitably make
wrongdoing more alluring": Snedaker v. King, supra. True, there
are many instances, as has been
pointed out previously, of attempted
governmental interference in such
relations. But at best, as Mr. Cohen
says, they are unpleasant and unedifying things to bring into court,
and our problem, and the problem
of the courts, is to determine
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whether we wish to extend this
type of civil jurisdiction further
than it has gone.
The bringing of marital grievances into court is obviously not
solely a question of judicial power
as limited by the maxim that equity
acts only in cases involving property interests. Excessive insistence
on the moribund nature of the
maxim has resulted in beclouding
the real issue. It is perhaps true,
as the opponents of the rule say,
that the test of the validity of a
legal maxim is public policy. But
that does not answer the question;
it is merely a more significant way
of asking the question, which is the
social advisability of extending the
range of governmental interference
beyond the point where experience
teaches that human laws should stop,
and good taste dictates that conscience be permitted to control.
HARRY SHRIMAN.

